Cellular Network Infrastructure » IMSI Pseudonymization

# Osmocom IMSI Pseudonymization Project

Specification and reference SIM applet implementation to conceal the IMSI of a

mobile subscriber on the radio interface in a 2G, 3G, 4G network.

Homepage: https://osmocom.org/projects/imsi-pseudo/wiki

## How it works

provisioned. After that pseudo IMSI is used for the first time in location

update, the HLR waits for some time, then decides the next pseudo IMSI and

sends it together with a delay value as SMS to the SIM. The SIM applet receives

the SMS and waits the specified delay. Then it overwrites its current IMSI with

the new one, marks the TMSI as invalid, and initiates the next location update.

Afterwards, the process repeats.

HLR <-> SIM  LOCATION UPDATE, imsi_pseudo=200

(time passes)

(time passes until the SMS arrives)

(SIM applet waits 60 seconds)

...

```

IMSIs. The pseudo IMSI must not be used by any other subscriber as pseudo IMSI,

but may be the real IMSI of another subscriber. The subscriber-specific counter

imsi_pseudo_i is 0 for the first allocated IMSI for that subscriber.

|------|--------|---------------|---------------|

|    1 |   100  |   200         | 0             |

is also provisioned with the IMSI pseudonymization applet.

subscriber has only one pseudo IMSI allocated. The HLR waits for some time.

Then it allocates the next pseudo IMSI from the pool of available IMSIs (as in

1., but with imsi_pseudo_i increased by one). The HLR sends the new

pseudo IMSI, the imsi_pseudo_i and a random delay value in one SMS to the SIM.

IMSI. This delay prevents easy correlation of the arrival of the SMS with the

Location Update that will follow in 3. by the SIM. Due to other latencies in

the network, this is a minimum delay. At this point, the subscriber has two

allocated pseudo IMSIs:

|------|--------|---------------|---------------|

|    1 |   100  |   200         | 0             |

|    2 |   100  |   123         | 1             |

subscriber already has two pseudo IMSIs allocated when doing the Location

Update. The HLR compares imsi_pseudo_i to find out if the Location Update was

done with the newer or older pseudo IMSI.

new IMSI. This may be caused by an SMS arriving late, possibly even months

after it was sent in case the UE was without power for a long period of time.

Therefore the HLR cannot deallocate the newer pseudo IMSI without risking that

the SIM would configure that IMSI and then be locked out (unable to do any

further location updates). Instead, the HLR proceeds like in a), but sends the

same unused new pseudo IMSI again instead of allocating a new one.

IMSI. The HLR deallocates the old pseudo IMSI and sends a Purge MS request to

the VLR with the old pseudo IMSI. Then the HLR proceeds like in a).

imsi_pseudo_i it has seen (initially: 0). If that is not the case, it discards

the message.

expires, the applet updates the last imsi_pseudo_i value that it has seen. Then

it overwrites the IMSI with the next pseudo IMSI and invalidates the TMSI and

Kc. The applet triggers a refresh, which causes the SIM to do a new Location

Update with the new IMSI.

04.08 Section 4.3.4). This is controlled by the network. Otherwise it becomes

trivial to correlate the detach of the old IMSI with the attach or Location

Update of the new IMSI.

Both the old and the new pseudo IMSI entry exist in the HLR.

try to send _the same_ new pseudo IMSI with the same new imsi_pseudo_i, as soon

as the next Location Update is complete.

that case, the SIM would continue using the old pseudo IMSI indefinitely.

applet, and warn the user if the same pseudo IMSI has been used more than N

(e.g. 5) times.

When deploying the IMSI pseudonymization, the operator should make sure that

the pseudo IMSI related SMS between the HLR and the SIM cannot be read or

modified by third parties. Otherwise, the next pseudonymous IMSI is leaked, and

in case of modifying the IMSI in the SMS, the SIM may be locked out of the

network.

OTA SMS are usually encrypted and authenticated (TS 03.48), with algorithms and

key lengths that the operator chooses (depending on the SIM and how it is

configured).

It was considered to add an additional layer of end2end encryption for the

pseudonymized IMSIs on top, but this is out-of-scope for this project. For

### User-configurable minimum duration between IMSI changes

It may be desirable to let users configure their minimum duration between IMSI

changes. This allows people with a high privacy requirement to switch their

pseudonymous IMSI more often, and it allows the IMSI change to happen less

often if it is distracting to the user. The latter depends on the phone's

software, for example:

* A Samsung GT-I9100 Galaxy SII smartphone with Android 4.0.3 displays a

  message at the bottom of the screen for about 5 seconds, but the user

  interface remains usable.

* A Samsung GT-E1200 feature phone displays a waiting screen for 16 to 17

  seconds and is unusable during that time.