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Manually Testing USIM Authentication » History » Revision 2

Revision 1 (laforge, 04/27/2022 05:17 PM) → Revision 2/4 (laforge, 04/27/2022 05:19 PM)

h1. Manually Testing USIM Authentication 

 This page describes how    you can use Osmocom tools to manually test USIM / ISIM authentication against a SIM card. 

 h2. Prerequisites 

 * A USIM card of which you know the secret key K + OP/OPc 
 * A smart card interface device ("reader") supported by pysim (such as any pcsc-lite / libccid compatible reader) 
 * @osmo-auc-gen@ program (part of [[libosmocore:]]) 
 * @pySim-shell@ program (part of [[pysim:]]) 


 h2. Step-by-step guide 



 h3. Generate a 16-byte random challenge 

 Let's use @/dev/random@ to generate 16 bytes of randomness; conver it to hexadecimal 

 <pre> 
 $ dd if=/dev/random bs=16 count=1 2>/dev/null | xxd -p -l 100 
 8188388ad5cdd481b02298ff29827791 
 </pre> 

 h3. Generating the actual quintuple using @osmo-auc-gen@ 

 This process mimics what is happening inside the Authentication Centre part of the HLR/HSS of your 2G/3G/4G network: Deriving RES from K, OP/OPc and SEQ/SQN. 

 We use the card-specific K + OPc values we received from the card manufacturer, as well as the random    value we generated in the previous    step 

 <pre> 
 $ osmo-auc-gen --3g --algorithm MILENAGE --key 77291F1E17132ADD86DC23A3AF601C89 --opc 831AFD01EF48692EC6FD18AEAB6CF381 --rand 8188388ad5cdd481b02298ff29827791 
 osmo-auc-gen (C) 2011-2012 by Harald Welte 
 This is FREE SOFTWARE with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY 

 RAND:     8188388ad5cdd481b02298ff29827791 
 AUTN:     7f62c464f6d60000b77b88e0f6b9449c 
 IK:       43c7bc1e8e193ed2e0e7e164126bbed5 
 CK:       a0188b5f7724878b86b9a336d8f2e327 
 RES:      b4013d66d107a2b6 
 IMS nonce:        gYg4itXN1IGwIpj/KYJ3kX9ixGT21gAAt3uI4Pa5RJw= 
 IMS res:          tAE9ZtEHorY= 
 SRES:     65069fd0 
 Kc:       8581751333a4e4ab 
 SQN:      32 
 IND:      0 
 </pre> 

 This shows us the following information 
 * input data (RAND, IND, SQN) 
 * the challenge the network would send via radio interface to the UE/phone/modem (RAND, AUTN) 
 * the data the network keeps on the network side and does *not* send over radio: 
 ** the A3 authentication result value (RES) 
 ** the A8 generated keys for integrity protection and ciphering (IK, CK) 
 ** the derived GSM values in case of fall-back to 2G (Kc, SRES) 

 

 h3. Performing authentication with the card, using @pySim-shell@ 

 We now perform what the phone/modem does with the SIM card when it receives the RAND + AUTN values from the cellular network via a @AUTHENTICATION REQUEST@. 

 For this, we use    [[pysim:]], specifically the @authentication@ command in it.    It takes two parameters: @rand@ and @autn@ (copy+pated from the above execution of osmo-auc-gen) 

 As we want to do UMTS-AKA against the USIM application on the card, we must first select @ADF.USIM@. 

 <pre> 
 $ ./pySim-shell.py -p0 
 Using PC/SC reader interface 
 Waiting for card... 
 Autodetected card type: sysmoISIM-SJA2 
 Info: Card is of type: UICC-SIM 
 AIDs on card: 
  USIM: a0000000871002ffffffff8907090000 (EF.DIR) 
  ISIM: a0000000871004ffffffff8907090000 (EF.DIR) 
  ADF.ISD: a000000003000000 
  ARA-M: a00000015141434c00 
 Detected CardModel: SysmocomSJA2 
 Welcome to pySim-shell! 
 pySIM-shell (MF)> select ADF.USIM 
 pySIM-shell (MF/ADF.USIM)> authenticate 8188388ad5cdd481b02298ff29827791 7f62c464f6d60000b77b88e0f6b9449c 
 { 
     "successful_3g_authentication": { 
         "res": "b4013d66d107a2b6", 
         "ck": "a0188b5f7724878b86b9a336d8f2e327", 
         "ik": "43c7bc1e8e193ed2e0e7e164126bbed5", 
         "kc": "8581751333a4e4ab" 
     } 
 } 
 </pre> 

 In this successful case, we see the card has accepted the AUTN nonce and generated the following output parameters: 
 * authentication result (RES); would be sent back to the network, where the network compares it with the expected RES value it has computed earlier. If it matches, authentication is OK. 
 * integrity protection (IK) and ciphering (CK) keys 
 ** used for air interface protection on 3G/UMTS after a @CIPHERING MODE COMMAND 
 ** used in derived forms for air interface protection and NAS protection in 4G/LTE 
 * GSM ciphering key (Kc); used for encryption on 2G/GSM/GPRS after a @CIPHERING MODE COMMAND@ 
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